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1 Introduction  
  
1.1 Presentation of the topic 
The topic to be addressed in the thesis is to what extent the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (hereafter ICRC) possesses international legal personality. The thesis will primari-
ly focus on two main issues. The first issue concerns the question of whether the ICRC has 
international legal personality and possible grounds for such an acquisition. The second issue 
relates to the legal consequences of an attribution of the legal status to the ICRC. 
 
During the 20
th
 century, the historical scope of international legal personality has been ex-
tended and challenged. The concept of international legal personality is “a doctrinal expres-
sion, which has sometimes given rise to controversy”.
1
 The statement holds true for ICRC, 
when its legal status occasionally is up for discussion. With the establishment of ad hoc tribu-
nals for prosecution of war crimes, the tribunals have from time to time been faced with legal 
questions regarding submission of evidence versus the right to confidentiality, which has ne-
cessitated an explanation of ICRC’s legal status. 
 
ICRC has on several occasions claimed to possess international legal personality. Documents 
deriving from ICRC tend to emphasize that the entity “is recognized as having an internation-
al legal personality” due to its hybrid nature.
2
 Nevertheless,
 
no unambiguous answer to the 
international status of the ICRC is to be found in its constitutional instruments. The organiza-
tion’s indistinct statements leave a complex picture regarding the reasons for ICRC’s alleged 
possession of international legal personality and the significance of the legal status. As ICRC 
plays an important role in armed conflicts and humanitarian disasters, a clarification of its 
legal status could be important for its present and future role in the international legal com-
munity. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 ICJ Reparations for Injuries p 178 
2
 Rona (2004) p 1 
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1.2 Sources of law 
The thesis addresses an issue of international character. The international legal methodology 
is thus applicable. The Statute of the International Court of Justice (hereafter ICJ) article 38 is 
the “traditional starting point” for the examination of the sources of international law.3 The 
provision is formally only binding upon the Court itself. However, it is generally recognized 
that it is the “authoritative statement of the sources of international law”.4  
 
Article 38 identifies the primary and secondary sources of law. According to the provision, 
the most relevant sources in international law are international conventions and customs, “the 
general principles of law”, “judicial decisions” and judicial teachings insofar as they derive 
from “the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations”. Although the sources ex-
plicitly are formulated as separate sources, they will in practice affect each other and not be 
used hierarchically.
5
 International convention is the “most important source of obligation in 
international law”.6 When interpreting the Conventions, the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (hereafter VCLT) section 3 expresses the general guidelines. VCLT section 3 is re-
garded as customary international law, thus binding on all nations.
7
  
 
With the general foundation in place, the issue in question gives rise to specific methodologi-
cal challenges. The general concept of international legal personality is not subject to com-
prehensive and detailed regulation in either international treaties or customary international 
law. To a large extent, the question of whether international organizations can be subjects of 
international law is today based on the Court’s considerations in the ICJ Reparations case 
from 1949. Following the decision, international literature and case law have contributed to 
the shaping of certain guidelines based on ICJ’s statements, and thus given the advisory opin-
ion precedent effect on the area. Despite the growing tendency for international organizations 
to include a clause in their internal constitutional documents regarding their international legal 
                                                 
3
 Crowe and Weston-Scheuber (2013) p 24 
4
 Crawford (2012) p 22, Crowe and Weston-Scheuber (2013) p 25 
5
 Crawford (2012) p 20 and 22 
6
 Ibid p 30 
7
 Evans (2006) p 120 
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personality, there is still no codification of the concept, indicating a certain degree of uncer-
tainties in legal circuits.  
  
As for ICRC and whether the organization possesses international legal personality, a large 
part of the analysis will be based on an analogy of the approaches applied to other interna-
tional organizations. Besides analogies, the major sources of the analysis have been interna-
tional conventions, international decisions, international agreements, particularly headquarter 
agreements, and legal literature in the form of books and articles. Due to a lack of specific 
sources which directly concerns the ICRC’s legal status, the thesis will focus on gathering the 
threads and make a comprehensive assessment of the organization’s legal status and the con-
sequences this entails.  
 
An additional difficulty with the research question is the issue of confidentiality. The confi-
dentiality practice of the ICRC has resulted in a difficulty to obtain certain sources of rele-
vance for the research question. Both headquarters and co-operation agreements fall within 
the scope of ICRC’s right to confidentiality, which will affect the thesis as there will be a lim-
ited reference to these legal sources. 
 
 
1.3 Delimitations 
The thesis essentially provides the basis for two main delimitations. First, the thesis will de-
lineate against treatment of national law. The thesis will not account for either national law 
regarding the concept of legal personality, or regarding ICRC’s rights or obligations under a 
nations own regulation, as these topics are irrelevant for the issue in question. 
 
Secondly, the thesis will only address international organizations. I choose to delimit against 
treatment of States and individuals as subjects of international law, besides to the extent it is a 
natural result of the treatment of international organization’s legal status. As ICRC is an or-
ganization, a treatment of the international legal personality of States and individuals would 
be redundant. 
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1.4 Structural overview 
The thesis is divided into five parts. The structure of the thesis is as follows. Part two provides 
a brief overview of ICRC. The purpose is to place the organization in the context of interna-
tional law. In order to explain ICRC’s legal status in the international community, it is natural 
and appropriate to initially briefly portray the background of the ICRC and its historical basis. 
The section will affect the reseach question it as it contains a presentation of the organiza-
tion’s mission and role in the international community which in turn will have significance for 
the question of international legal personality. 
 
In the third part, the thesis provides a framework of the concept of legal personality in terms 
of definition, scope and the consequences of the attribution. In order to evaluate whether 
ICRC possesses international legal personality, the thesis will first address the concept in re-
gards to international organizations as such. The main focus of the thesis will be on part four. 
In this part, the thesis applies the legal doctrine of international legal personality to ICRC, and 
also covers the consequences of a possible attribution of international legal personality. The 
fifth and final part will contain a possible conclusion on the overall issue. 
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2 ICRC – a unique actor in international law 
 
2.1 The creation of the ICRC 
During the Battle of Solferino in the Second Italian War of Independence between Austria 
and France 24 June 1859, the Swiss businessman Jean-Henri Dunant found himself in the 
midst of the battle. Based on his recorded impressions and willingness to care for the wound-
ed and sick soldiers, he published A Memory of Solferino in 1862.
8
 The book was revolution-
ary for its time and included, as part of Dunant’s vision, two proposals for the international 
community; the establishment of relief societies to care for wounded soldiers and the formula-
tion of “some international principle, sanctioned by a Convention inviolate in character”.9 
 
Inspired by his experiences and the tremendous positive response of the book, Dunant togeth-
er with four other Swiss citizens formed the International Committee for Relief to the 
Wounded in 1863 in Geneva, Switzerland. The Committee was later renamed the Internation-
al Committee of the Red Cross and lay the foundation for the Red Cross movement. A year 
after the organization’s establishment, Dunant’s entire vision materialized with the adoption 
of the first Geneva Convention, a treaty aiming to improve the situation for soldiers injured 
during armed conflict.
10
 
 
Despite its early creation and long-lasting efforts in times of conflict, the ICRC has not al-
ways been as present in the public eye as seen today. During the 21
st
 century, the ICRC re-
ceived more attention from the press, due to the organization’s involvement in humanitarian 
tragedies, such as the civil war in Somalia in the 1990s.
11
 The new attention must also be seen 
in context with ICRC’s presence and efforts in the wars involving Afghanistan and Iraq. It 
                                                 
8
 ICRC (28-12-2004)  
9
 A Memory of Solferino (1986) p 126 
10
 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field. Geneva, 22 August 
1864 
11
 Hassan (2012) p 3 
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was particularly the “ICRC protection efforts for prisoners” which brought them renewed 
attention and interest by the press.
12
  
 
ICRC has not only gained a tremendous attention from the press, but also from the interna-
tional community as a whole. The granting of four Nobel Peace Prizes during the 20
th
 century 
signalizes faith and support of the activities the ICRC has embarked upon.
13
 
 
As part of the largest humanitarian movement worldwide the ICRC is bound to “act at all 
times in accordance with the Fundamental Principles”.14 The movement as a whole is founded 
on seven fundamental principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary 
service, unity and universality.
15
 The principles permeate and govern the organization’s ac-
tivities and development. However, only the first four are relevant in regards to ICRC.
16
 In 
order to reach ICRC’s goal to bring humanitarian protection in times of armed conflict, the 
principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence are means to reach this goal. Impartial-
ity is an important aspect of humanitarian protection in the sense that ICRC should not make 
any distinction amongst the individuals in need.
17
 When it comes to neutrality, the organiza-
tion must not let itself by guided by political powers, but rather focus on their humanitarian 
goal.
18
 As for the principle of independence, ICRC must be independent from States and 
“other power centers”, especially from “western liberal democracies”, in order to maintain 
neutrality and impartiality.
19
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Forsythe (2005) p 3 
13
 Libæk (2003)  
14
 The Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement art. 1 no. 2 
15
 Preamble of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 
16
 Forsythe (2005) p 161 
17
 Ibid p 163 
18
 Ibid p 169, 173 
19
 Ibid p 182 
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2.2 ICRC’s mandate and role under international law 
 
Following the first Geneva Convention of 1864, Dunant’s vision to establish international 
principles in times of conflict has developed into a body of rules known as the International 
Humanitarian Law (hereafter IHL). The main instruments of IHL are the four Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977. With a total of 194 ratifying 
States, the Geneva Conventions are today regarded universally applicable, whereas the two 
Additional Protocols are on their way to becoming universal.
20
 The ICRC is given a wide 
mandate by the community of States under the Geneva Conventions. 
 
ICRC’s mandate further stems from the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Cres-
cent Movement. The Statues were adopted at the 25
th
 International Conference of the Red 
Cross in 1986, with the participation of the High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conven-
tion. The Statutes thus “reflect the states’ views on the activities of the ICRC”.21  
 
The mandate of ICRC can roughly be divided in two parts. First, ICRC is mandated to protect 
and assist the victims of armed conflict and internal disturbance. Second, the organization acts 
as a promoter and guardian of IHL.
22
 It is first and foremost the second part of the mandate 
that sets ICRC apart from other organizations, giving it a unique position in IHL.
23
 The 
founding of ICRC marked the beginning of international humanitarian law, and through the 
Geneva Conventions and its Protocols, the function to act as a guardian for IHL was “formal-
ly entrusted” to ICRC by the international community, as an act of faith.24 
 
  
                                                 
20
 ICRC website  <http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview 
geneva-conventions.htm, Lavoyer and Maresca (1999) p 502 
21
 Lavoyer and Maresca (1999) p 504 
22
 Sandoz (1998) 
23
 Lavoyer and Maresca (1999) p 504 
24
 Sandoz (1998) 
8 
 
2.2.1 Protect and assist victims of armed conflicts 
Initially, the ICRC focused its work “on the wounded soldier in international war”.25 Today 
its scope has evolved, and the focus is no longer solely on the conditions of the belligerents, 
but on humanitarian issues in general in times of armed conflict. Still, the protection and as-
sistance of victims of armed conflict is the “principal purpose” of ICRC.26 The mandate is in 
line with ICRC’s mission statement clarifying that the organization’s: 
 
“…exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of 
armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance.”27 
 
The organization is given the right to perform several activities in order to fulfil this part of 
their mandate. 
 
On a general basis, protected persons have the right to seek humanitarian assistance from the 
ICRC when the occupying power fails to care for the inhabitants.
28
 The organization “shall be 
granted all facilities for that purpose” by the authority in concern.29 The humanitarian assis-
tance will often include food and water, medical care and other basic needs.
30
 During the civil 
war in Somalia, with its massive starvation from 1991-1993, the humanitarian operations by 
the ICRC proved to be the largest humanitarian intervention since the Second World War, 
signalizing the importance of ICRC’s humanitarian assistance.31  
 
The ICRC has received under the Geneva Conventions a mandate to exercise duties usually 
granted to the Protecting Powers when a State for different reasons is not appointed.
32
 Under 
this mandate, the ICRC will act as a substitute for a Protecting Power. Protecting Powers is 
defined as “a neutral or other State not a Party to the conflict which has been designated by a 
                                                 
25
 Forsythe (2005) p 2 
26
 Fleck (2008) p 713 
27
 The ICRC`s Mission Statement (19-06-2008) 
28
 GC IV art. 30 (1) 
29
 GC IV art. 30 (2) 
30
 Fleck (2008) p 269 
31
 Hassan (2012) p 3 
32
 AP I art. 5 (4) 
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Party to the conflict and accepted by the adverse Party and has agreed to carry out the func-
tions assigned to” it under the Geneva Conventions. The function normally assigned to such 
State is the “duty of safeguarding the interests of the Parties to the conflict”.33 
 
As one of its core tasks, the ICRC has a formal right to visit and interview prisoners of war 
(POW) and civilian internees to make sure the belligerent parties are treating them humane-
ly.
34
 ICRC has performed the task long before it was enshrined in a written legal text, as the 
organization responded to humanitarian needs during both World Wars, without authorization 
in the Geneva Conventions.
35
 Today, the ICRC “plays a role alongside the Protecting Pow-
ers”, in what has become “a benchmark for the requisite minimum of civilized behaviour” in 
armed conflict.
36
 By illustration, one can mention the visitation by ICRC delegates to the 
Guantanamo Bay and Robben Island during Nelson Mandela’s imprisonment.37 The ICRC is 
the sole entity with a conventional right to visit prisoners of war. Other organizations, such as 
Amnesty International, are dependent on the consent of States in order to perform such an 
action. During 2012, the ICRC visited an overwhelming 540,669 detainees.
38
  
 
Through its Central Tracing Agency, the ICRC serves as an intermediary between belligerent 
parties. The agency was established in order to provide a range of neutral tracing services in 
times of conflict.
39
 Although the need to stay in touch with family members is both basic and 
essential, history has shown that the authorities often fail to report and keep the families of 
soldiers updated on the situation both during and after the war is terminated.
40
 Its mandate 
under the Geneva Conventions gives ICRC the right to perform services roughly divided into 
two categories. The agency in mandated to transmit information on POW or civilian internees 
                                                 
33
 AP I art. 5 (1) 
34
 GC III art. 126 and GC IV art. 143 
35
 Forsythe (2007) p 67 
36
 Gazzini (2009) p 9, Forsythe (2007) p 67 
37
 Forsythe (2007) p 75, Duffy (2005) p 382 
38
 ICRC Annual Report 2012 p 85 
39
 ICRC website  <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/centra-tracing-agency-interview 
070410.htm 
40
 Ibid 
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to the other party of the conflict in order to inform their families.
41
 Secondly, the agency 
works under a mandate to inform families of soldiers died in the battlefield.
42
  In 2012, 
720,128 people contacted ICRC offices worldwide in the need for services “related to protec-
tion and restoring family links”.43  
 
 
2.2.2 Promoter and guardian of IHL 
The first task granted to the ICRC in order to fulfil this part of their mandate is to monitor 
compliance with IHL. This is generally recognized, even though the ICRC has no “express 
supervisory authority in this respect”.44 Through its field delegates, the ICRC has devoted its 
work to make sure belligerent parties comply with the applicable rules of IHL. As part of the 
task, ICRC helps with the enforcement of IHL, though mostly through “cooperation in appli-
cation of services and programs”, rather than “public denunciation and shaming”.45  
 
Besides monitoring compliance with IHL, ICRC works towards promoting and disseminating 
IHL.
46
 Spreading the message about IHL permeates the organization’s work and is directed 
towards every group of the society. Dissemination takes place in various forms; from radio 
and TV shows to courses by ICRC delegates.
47
 In order to gain acceptance within the military 
communities, the ICRC has specialised courses for “armed and security forces”, often led by 
former military officers, now under ICRC employment.
48
   
 
The third and final aspect of this mandate concerns the development of IHL, a task performed 
by ICRC from the very beginning. With a humanitarian goal to protect the victims of armed 
conflict, ICRC was the initiator for the first Geneva Convention, and has had a leading role in 
the development of IHL ever since. The Movement’s Statutes article 5 (2) litra g confirms 
                                                 
41
 GC III art. 123 and GC IV art. 140 
42
 GC I art. 16 
43
 ICRC Annual Report 2012 p 86 
44
 Fleck (2008) p 714 
45
 Forsythe (2005) p 274 
46
 The Movement`s Statutes art. 5 (2) litra g 
47
 Forsythe (2005) p 273, Lavoyer and Maresca (1999) p 505 
48
 I.c. 
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ICRC’s mandate to “prepare any development” of IHL. The mandate enables ICRC to “initi-
ate, inspire and facilitate the strengthening and development of” IHL.49 ICRC has had a 
unique and persistent role in the expansion of “humanitarian protection from international to 
internal wars”.50 Both GCs common article 3 and the Additional Protocol II, applicable in 
non-international armed conflicts, are inspired by the field work and drafting performed by 
the ICRC.
51
 The organization has also had a leading role in the strengthening of IHL placing 
limitations on means and methods used in warfare. A classic example is ICRC’s leading role 
in the development of the 1997 Ottawa Treaty on landmines.
52
 The organization put pressure 
on the Canadian government which eventually submitted the issue of landmines for the inter-
national community. Leading up to the Convention, the ICRC worked as an active pioneer 
based on the experiences the organization had made in terms of the consequences of 
landmines.
53
  
 
 
2.3 Legal nature and status 
The ICRC was originally a private organization established under the Swiss Civil Code by the 
initiative of individuals. Despite still having its roots in Swiss law, the organization now oper-
ates in over 80 countries with employment beyond the Swiss borders.
54
 The fact that the indi-
vidual, national based organization operates under an international mandate has resulted in 
debates regarding the categorization of the organization, whether it is an IGO or an NGO. The 
debate will be elaborated under section 4.1.1. Regardless of the categorization, ICRC is grant-
ed a wide international mandate giving it a unique status in the international community. Ac-
cording to the organization’s Statutes, the “ICRC has legal personality”, whereas the Move-
ment’s Statues states that the ICRC “is an independent humanitarian organization having a 
status of its own”.55 ICRC’s Statutes article 2 does not clarify whether it has national or inter-
                                                 
49
 Nobel (1993) p 81 
50
 Forsythe (2007) p 66 
51
 I.c. 
52
 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti Personnel Mines and 
on Their Destruction, 18 September 1997 
53
 Forsythe (2005) p 265 
54
 Lavoyer and Maresca (1999) p 508, ICRC website <http://www.icrc.org/eng/where-we-work/index.jsp>  
55
 ICRC Statute art. 2 and The Movement Statutes art. 5 (1) (author’s emphasis) 
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national legal personality in mind, creating a diffusing picture. However, in internal docu-
ments and claims against ad hoc tribunals, ICRC has portrayed itself as being in the posses-
sion of international legal personality.
56
 
 
Despite the seemingly internal consensus, the Geneva Conventions and its Additional Proto-
cols are silent in regards to the legal status of ICRC. Nor do the conventions or protocols im-
pose upon the contracting Parties an obligation to recognize ICRC as a subject of international 
law.
57
 Still, this peculiar organization holds a special role in the international community. Le-
gal scholars, international organizations and national governments have from time to time 
acknowledged the international legal status of ICRC. Some have recognized ICRC as a legal 
person based on an analogy to IGOs, whereas others attribute the status in line with the organ-
izations special role and recognition by the international community.
58
  
 
The thesis will hereinafter examine whether the international community as a whole grants the 
ICRC international legal personality in accordance with the organization’s own perception, 
and the possible basis for such an attribution. The legal personality of the ICRC will to a cer-
tain extent depend upon the communities’ acceptance of international organizations as legal 
persons on a general basis. 
 
 
                                                 
56
 Eg. Rona (2004) p 1 
57
 Gazzini (2009) p 3 
58
 Rona (2002) p 209, Rossi (2010) p 40  
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3 International legal personality – a complex 
issue 
 
3.1 The doctrine of legal personality 
 
3.1.1 The notion 
The doctrine of legal personality exists in both national and international law. The concept is 
in international law used “in analogy to municipal law”, although the entities possessing legal 
personality is not the same within the two different legal systems.
59
 It is a legal concept ena-
bling the community to distinguish between the entities that are capable of acting with legal 
effects in a given legal system.
60
 The possession of international legal personality thus enables 
an entity to act in the international legal system. 
 
The term ‘international legal personality’ is used synonymously with the term ‘subject of in-
ternational law’.61 They are usually regarded as interchangeable concepts in the sense that 
those entities possessing international legal personality are subjects of international law, and 
visa versa.
62
  It will be alternated between the two terms in the thesis, whichever falls natural-
ly. 
 
 
3.1.1.1 Definition 
The notion of legal personality is often described as a philosophical and abstract topic as there 
is an “absence of an established international law of persons”.63 There exists no treaty or cus-
tomary law establishing an international law of persons or the criteria set out for granting the 
status. As a result, most guidelines in respect of international legal personality come from 
                                                 
59
 Portmann (2010) p 5 
60
 I.c. 
61
 Rossi (2010) p 29, Portmann (2010) p 1, Schermers and Blokker (2011) p 985 
62
 Rossi (2010) p 29 
63
 Portmann (2010) p 10 
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general considerations of international law. The debate, however, is not groundless or without 
legally acceptable sources. The “developments in international practice”, in terms of State 
practice and the practice of international tribunals are taken into account in the international 
debate on legal personality.
64
 However, the interpretation on State practice and case law can 
differ with the theoretical standpoint of the interpreter, making it difficult to reach a consen-
sus.  
 
The International Court of Justice (hereafter ICJ) stated in Reparation for Injuries that having 
international legal personality means that an entity: 
 
“…is a subject of international law and capable of possessing international rights and 
duties, and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international 
claims.”65 
 
The quote from ICJ is the most “authoritative statement on international personality” to this 
day and is often cited as the definition of international legal personality.
66
 The disadvantage 
with the definition is that it does not address which entities are to be regarded as international 
persons, or what criteria must be met before the status can be attributed. These issues will be 
addressed later in the thesis.  
 
A second, heavily debated problem with the definition from the Reparation case is its circu-
larity. After a further analysis, one notices that it is not clear what comes first: the possession 
of international legal personality or the possession of international rights and duties. As 
Brownlie stated it, the definition is circular because:  
 
“while the indicia referred to depend in theory on the existence of a legal person, the 
main way of determining whether the relevant capacity exists in case of doubt is to in-
quire whether it is in fact exercised”.67 
                                                 
64
 I.c. 
65
 ICJ Reparations for Injuries p 179 
66
 Portmann (2010) p 9, Rossi (2010) p 31 
67
 Crawford (2012) p 115 
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An entity cannot, based on the definition from the Reparation case, possess international legal 
personality unless it is “already capable of acting at the international level”.68 The circular 
problem is still relevant and not finally clarified by the international community.  
 
 
3.1.1.2 Significance 
Regardless of the debates and controversial aspects of the concept, it is commonly being used 
and attributed to new entities. So what exactly is the significance of possessing international 
legal personality?  
 
Again, there is a wealth of different opinions amongst the legal scholars. Klabbers considers 
the concept merely as an “academic label”, arguing that “a subject of international law is a 
legitimate subject of international research and reflection”.69 Some legal scholars even go to 
the extent of claiming the notion to have “no credible reality” or “functional purpose”.70 Oth-
ers are of the opinion that the concept is more than just a label of interest. Amerasinghe sub-
mits several practical reasons for the concept’s significance in international law. In his view, 
the concept enables organizations to have a right of its own, which in turn grants them with 
the capacity to have “rights, duties, powers… distinct from its members or its creators…”71 
Similarly, Shaw regards the status as “crucial” as it is essential for the organization’s ability 
“to maintain and enforce claims”.72  
 
Generally speaking, the notion is used to “distinguish between those social actors the interna-
tional legal system takes account of and those being excluded from it”.73 In this sense, the 
status is necessary in order to participate at the international level in a legal context. The sta-
                                                 
68
 Clapham (2006) p 64 
69
 Klabbers (2002) p 43 
70
 Clapham (2006) p 63 
71
 Amerasinghe (2005) p 68 and 78 
72
 Shaw (2008) p 195 
73
 Portmann (2010) p 5 
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tus enables entities to function in the legal order, and is thus to a certain extent a prerequisite 
for legal capacity.  
 
 
3.1.2 Historical limitation 
In the traditional sense, the status of international legal personality has been limited to 
States.
74
 The limited acknowledgment of legal personality in international law reflects the 
history of international law. States created public international law for States, to regulate the 
relations between nations.
75
  
 
Within international law, the principle of sovereignty prevails to a great extent. The sovereign 
State system is generally said to have been introduced with the signing of the Peace Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648, a treaty ending the Thirty Years War.
76
 The Treaty of Westphalia is re-
garded as an enactment of the States’ status as sovereign. This means that the States have full 
authority over their own territory.
77
 Externally, the principle implies a prohibition to interfere 
with a nation’s internal affairs and State detachment to international regulation unless it oc-
curs by its own free will.
78
  
 
 
3.1.3 Expansion of the legal doctrine 
Even though States are still the primary subjects of international law, the 20
th
 century allowed 
for an expansion of the doctrine. New legal actors have entered the international plane, lead-
ing to a development consequently recognizing that entities other than States can be subjects 
of international law.
79
 It is no longer viable to consider States the only natural subjects of in-
ternational law. The ICJ in the Reparations case supported this view when they stated that: 
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“Throughout its history… the progressive increase in the collective activities of States 
has already given rise to instances of action upon the international plane by certain en-
tities which are not States”.80  
 
However, it is still an unresolved issue which entities that can obtain international legal per-
sonality and the criteria required for the attribution. It does not seem to be a clear pattern sig-
nifying the status, but rather that the subjects of international law’s “nature depends upon the 
needs of the community”.81  
 
 
3.1.3.1 International governmental organizations (IGOs) 
VCLT article 2 (1) (i) defines international organizations as “an intergovernmental organiza-
tion”. The definition thus excludes non-governmental organizations. The definition is short 
and vague, and comprises all intergovernmental international organizations. ILC’s 2011 Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations article 2 (a) on the other hand 
defines IGO as: 
 
“…an organization established by treaty or other instrument governed by international 
law and possessing its own international legal personality”. 
 
The definition is new and developed “in the context of international responsibility”, an obliga-
tion which presupposes legal personality.
82
 The definition does not change the fact that IGOs 
can be an international organization without having legal personality. The different definitions 
give us two of the basic characteristics of an IGO; it is established by an international instru-
ment and is primarily composed of States. 
 
IGOs can roughly be divided into three different categories. There are the global organiza-
tions, such as the United Nations (hereafter UN), regional organizations, like NATO and su-
pranational organizations. The latter is characterized by the ability to possess authority at the 
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expense of the State’s own authority. The European Union (hereafter EU) is the prime exam-
ple. 
 
IGOs have existed since the nineteenth century.
83
 However, the attribution of international 
legal personality to these entities was not a serious question until after 1919 with the founding 
of the League of Nations.
84
 Despite the lack of a reference to the organization’s status in its 
Covenant, Switzerland recognized “its separate existence on the international plane” in 
1926.
85
  
 
In 1949, the ICJ Reparation case settled that international organizations can possess interna-
tional legal personality. The Court was asked to give an advisory opinion on UN’s capacity to 
bring an international claim against the responsible government for injuries to its personnel. 
The advice was made on the background of an assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte, a 
Swedish diplomat appointed as a mediator by the United Nations Security Council.
86
 During 
his mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948, Jewish Zionist nationalists shot the diplo-
mat.
87
 The advisory opinion did not only deal with UN’s capacity to bring an international 
claim against a state, but was also concerned with “the objective personality of the United 
Nations” given that Israel as the defendant was not a member of UN at that time.88 In order to 
answer the submitted question, the Court first had to examine whether the organization pos-
sessed international legal personality. 
 
The UN Charter did not expressly confer legal personality to the UN. The Court thus contin-
ued with an examination of the organization’s characteristics, stating that:  
 
“…the Organization was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and 
enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the posses-
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sion of  a large measure of international personality and the capacity to operate upon 
an international plane.”89 
 
ICJ emphasized that in order for the UN to fulfil its tasks “the attribution of international per-
sonality is indispensable”.90 With this in mind, the Court found that “the Organization is an 
international person”.91  
 
Despite the fact that the remarks from the ICJ are limited to the UN, legal scholars and practi-
tioners have used the conclusion analogously, claiming that the same arguments are valid for 
other IGOs.
92
 The following statement from the ICJ in its advisory opinion from 1980 is an 
example of this view: 
 
“International organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound 
by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law…”93 
 
Following the advisory opinions from ICJ, several other IGOs have been granted legal per-
sonality. The Lisbon Treaty article 46 A states that EU “shall have legal personality”.94 The 
provision is intended to cover both national and international legal personality.
95
 As for 
NATO, it is generally recognized that the entity is an international legal person.
96
 It is safe to 
say that it today is generally accepted that IGOs can possess international legal personality.
97
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3.1.3.2 International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
To this day, there is no consensus around a universal definition of NGO.
98
 The UN Charter 
does not contain a definition, despite the statement of the Economic and Social Council’s 
right to attribute consultative status to NGOs under article 71. Regardless of the lack of a uni-
versal definition, specific features give NGOs it characteristics. As the name indicates, NGOs 
are created without the involvement of States and without States as their members.
99
 They are 
rather established at the initiative of individuals. Besides the non-governmental interference, 
general features of NGOs are their non-profit making aim, volunteer work and the fact that 
they often have their grounds in goals of humanitarian value.
100
 To illustrate, one can mention 
Amnesty International and Greenpeace.
101
  
 
The attribution of international legal personality is a current and debated issue. The interna-
tional community disagree on the existing and future status of NGOs. Compared to IGOs such 
as the UN, the identification of the functions and rights of NGOs is a demanding task, as they 
are scattered in various international instruments.
102
 The difficulty in reaching a conclusion in 
regards to the possession and exercise of rights and duties by NGOs, have led scholars to ar-
gue that international legal personality could be conferred to NGOs based on recognition by 
the international community. To date, no States have explicitly recognized NGOs as entities 
in the possession of international legal personality.
103
 However, a small number of States have 
ratified the European Convention of the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International 
Non-Governmental Organizations (Convention 124), imposing an obligation to recognize the 
qualified international legal personality of NGOs.
104
 The convention was adopted in 1986 and 
has still not entered into effect, indicating a limited success.
105
 Despite their important influ-
ence in the international community, NGOs “remain outside the international legal system” as 
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private legal entities.
106
 However, this could be a temporary state. The ICJ stated in the 
LaGrand case in 2001 that individuals are subjects of international law due to their possession 
of individual international rights.
107
 Some argue that the Court in this case laid the foundation 
for future recognition of NGOs’ legal status because: 
 
“The Court stated in the LaGrand case that individuals are also subjects of interna-
tional law. This approach may lead the Court to assert the legal personality even of 
non-governmental organizations. It would be difficult to understand why individuals 
may acquire rights and obligations under international law while the same could not 
occur with any international organization, provided that it is an entity which is distinct 
from its members”.108 
 
 
3.2 Approaches to the legal doctrine 
As mentioned in section 3.1.1, the conditions or indicia required for international legal per-
sonality is an issue which has brought international concern and debate. To date, it is still un-
resolved according to what criteria non-state actors can become subjects of international 
law.
109
 This section will address the most relevant theories and the conditions they accentuate. 
 
 
3.2.1 Two competing theories 
There are seemingly two competing theories based on an analysis of the ICJ Reparation case. 
According to international legal scholars, the two theories can be deduced from the advisory 
opinion, even though they are not expressly mentioned in the text. The two theories are based 
on the ICJ ruling regarding the UN’s legal status, but are applicable to other IGOs.   
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3.2.1.1 The subjective theory  
The subjective theory is also referred to as ‘the will theory’. According to the theory, the will 
of the founders is the decisive criteria for the possession of legal personality. The will of the 
founders is the will of the members or member States in respect of IGOs. The proponents of 
this theory identify: 
 
“…certain rights, duties and powers expressly conferred upon the organization and de-
rive from these the international personality of the organization”.110  
 
The theory is based on the assumption of “freely expressed consent of states” in international 
law.
111
 The assumption enables the member States to “breathe personality into an organiza-
tion” by expressly conferring legal personality to the organization in its Constitution, in what 
is known as the doctrine of delegated powers.
112
 The idea is that the members can choose to 
expressly include a section relating to the legal personality of the organization in its constitu-
tive document. In the Reparations case, the UN Charter did not expressly confer legal person-
ality to the organization. It is today becoming more prevalent for international organizations 
to expressly include international legal personality in their constitutive documents.
113
  
 
Despite the lack of an expressed recognition of legal personality, the ICJ concluded in the 
Reparations case that the UN “could not carry out the intentions of its founders if it was de-
void of international personality”.114 The statement indicates that a lack of an expressed inten-
tion to possess legal personality is not decisive, as the status can be granted if the intention is 
implied. The doctrine of implied powers advocates that international legal personality can be 
granted by reviewing the rights and obligations assigned to the organization.
115
 For instance, 
if the organization is empowered with the capacity to conclude treaties, the proponents of the 
theory suggest that such powers cannot be exercised without the organization having the sta-
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tus as a subject of international law.
116
 The organization’s practice can also provide guidance 
– one must assess whether the entity has acted with the intention of being a subject of interna-
tional law. The common feature is that the constitutional provisions undergo an “extensive 
interpretation” to either cover aspects beyond their original meaning or be supplemented by 
the organization’s subsequent practice.117 
 
 
3.2.1.2 The objective theory 
The objective theory is based on the view that organizations can attain legal personality “by 
performing certain functions on the international plane”.118 The organization’s intention is not 
decisive according to this theory, as fulfilment of certain objective criteria is the essential re-
quirement for the possession of international legal personality. The foundation of legal per-
sonality is, according to the supporters, “identified in general international law”.119 The inter-
national community shapes the relevant criteria, until now mainly by case law and the legal 
scholars.
120
  
 
Finn Seyersted originally developed the theory in 1964. He suggested the following criteria 
for IGOs in the context of legal personality:
121
 
 
1. “International organs… which are not all subject to the authority of any other State 
or organized community” other than the participating nations;  
2. “which are not authorized by all their acts to assume obligations (merely) on behalf 
of the several participating communities”. 
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The theory and its criteria have developed over time. Ian Brownlie formulated his three-part 
test applicable to international organizations based on the different views on international 
legal personality in the international community: 
 
“1. a permanent association of states, with lawful objects, equipped with organs; 
2. a distinction, in terms of legal powers and purposes, between the organization and  
its member states;  
3. the existence of legal powers exercisable on the international plane and not solely  
within the national systems of one of more states.”122 
 
When addressing the issue of international legal personality, Brownlie emphasizes the im-
portance of existing organs. Organizations will usually be equipped with a variety of plenary, 
executive and administrative organs.
123
 According to Brownlie, organizations can exist “but 
lack the organs and objects necessary for legal personality”, indicating that its structure pro-
vides a guideline for the question of legal personality.
124
 As long as the organization has “at 
least one organ with a will distinct from that of the member states”, it will according to the 
objective theory possess international legal personality.
125
 Furthermore, the organization’s 
independence from its members is highly relevant. An organization in the possession of inter-
national legal personality must be able to perform its functions independent and separate from 
its members. As a final criterion, the organization must be in the possession of functions and 
powers intended to be exercised within the international legal system. 
 
Based on the previous, slightly indistinct formulations, Rossi accounts for three objective cri-
teria; the entity in concern must have the capacity and actual possession of international rights 
and duties and in addition obtain recognition by the general community.
126
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3.2.1.3 A leading theory? 
There is an ongoing debate between international legal scholars in regards to the two theories. 
The legal scholars have not yet been able to reach a consensual opinion on what theory that 
prevails in public international law. 
 
The advisory opinion is not clear in its choice of approach to the legal doctrine, and thus 
“leaves a very unclear picture” in regards to when and how an organization possesses legal 
personality.
127
 The Court did not specifically or exclusively refer to the individual objective 
criteria established in the international literature. They may be implied in the judgement, but 
were not articulated clearly.
128
 At the same time, the Court emphasized the importance of the 
intentions of the founders in regards of the UN’s legal status. Sands and Klein claim the ap-
proach by the Court “essentially” was subjective.129 Others interpret the Court’s statements as 
a mixture of the two theories, in the sense that the decisive is an examination of the organiza-
tion’s purpose and its rights and functions, looking at whether these elements can only be ex-
plained on the basis of the status as a subject of international law.
130
 Ultimately, it appears 
that the Court made an overall judgment based on the specific organization and its purpose 
and intent in the international community. The ambiguity of the ICJ in the Reparations case 
implies that it is appropriate to conclude that there is no leading theory in either legal litera-
ture or in practice.  
  
 
3.2.2 The decisive criteria - conflicting opinions in the literature 
It remains to consider whether one can conclude on certain applicable criteria for international 
legal personality. 
 
Klabbers believes that there is “no formal criteria” for international legal personality.131 In-
stead, he offers what he calls a “practical checklist” for legal personality:   
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“…one may ask oneself whether an entity enjoys direct rights or obligations under in-
ternational law. If so, it is probably safe to say it ranks as a subject of international 
law, at least to the extent… of those same rights or obligations”.132  
 
Other scholars are still off the impression that legal personality relies on the fulfilment of cer-
tain basic objective criteria. Alongside Seyersted and Brownlie, prominent scholars empha-
size the organization’s existence of lawful organs and independence from its members in re-
gards to “legal rights, duties, power and liabilities” as basic objective criteria for international 
legal personality.
133
 Likewise, Shaw believes the question of whether international legal per-
sonality can be attributed to an organization depends upon “its constitutional status, its actual 
powers and practice”.134 The argumentation from legal scholars seems to indicate the same 
view as ICJ in regards to UN in the Reparations case; the decisive criteria is that the organiza-
tion is granted rights and functions that it is unable to perform without the possession of legal 
personality.  
 
In addition, it is debated whether the possession of legal personality requires more than the 
fulfilment of objective criteria. Amerasinghe argues that the attribution of international legal 
personality to international organizations is not as simple “as identifying certain objective 
criteria which confer personality in general international law”.135 The criteria must be “tested 
in relation to the ‘intention’ behind the establishment of the organization”.136  
 
Acceptance by the community in terms of recognition is still a doctrinal controversy.
137
 Klab-
bers argues that the insufficient criteria for legal personality make recognition the “key 
word”.138 Recognition will provide an entity with a full-fledged legal position. Shaw is of the 
same impression, stating that legal personality is “participation plus some form of community 
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acceptance”.139 He claims that legal personality can be acquired “by a combination of treaty 
provisions and recognition… by other international persons”.140 Like Amerasinghe, Shaw 
considers the decisive requirement for legal personality the possession and exercise of inter-
national rights and duties alongside with an element of recognition from the community. 
 
Roland Portmann launched his comprehensive analysis on the concept of legal personality in 
2010, where he made the observation from international legal arguments leading towards five 
different conceptions on international legal personality.
141
 Despite its newly arrival, it is al-
ready being cited by other qualified international authors.
142
 According to Portmann, the dif-
ferent conceptions attribute legal personality to different entities, include different mecha-
nisms and result in different consequences. 
 
The ‘states-only conception’ is characterized by its condition of statehood in order to possess 
international legal personality. Contrary to the ‘states-only conception’, the ‘recognition con-
ception’ has allowed for other entities than States to acquire international legal personality as 
“derivative or secondary international persons”.143 As the conception indicates, “explicit or 
implicit recognition by states” is a condition for legal personality for secondary international 
persons.
144
  The third conception, the ‘individualistic conception’, is characterized by the pre-
sumption of individuals possessing legal personality “when international norms of fundamen-
tal importance are concerned”.145 The classic examples are fundamental human rights and 
criminal law. The ‘formal conception’ declares “international law an open system”, indicating 
that no specific entity is presumed to possess legal personality, nor is there any consequences 
attached to the status
 146
. The fifth and final conception is the ‘actor conception’. The decisive 
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factor for this conception is that all legal actors “are relevant for the international legal sys-
tem”, and thus possess legal personality.147  
 
 
3.3 Consequences of the attribution of legal personality 
The concept of international legal personality is a relative one. Possessing legal personality 
only entails the capability to have rights and duties.  As a result, the consequences of legal 
personality will vary depending on the entity possessing the status. ICJ stated the following in 
the Reparations case regarding the consequences of the attribution of international legal per-
sonality to the UN: 
 
“Whereas a State possesses the totality of international rights and duties recognized by 
international law, the rights and duties of an entity such as the Organization must de-
pend upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent docu-
ments and developed in practice”.148 
 
Pursuant to the statement, organization’s legal personality is limited, as opposed to States who 
possess “the totality of international rights and duties recognized by international law”.149 
Besides the full legal capacity, States have the same rights and duties in international law re-
gardless of their size, number of inhabitants or influential position, whereas other entities have 
different capacities based on their functions and powers.
150
 This entails that one must under-
take an analysis of the legal instrument granting each entity certain functions in order to find 
its implicit capacities.  
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3.3.1 Qualified vs. objective legal personality 
The concept of legal personality gives rise to the question of the validity of the status to non-
member States unconditional of their recognition. There is an important distinction between 
objective and qualified legal personality.  
 
Qualified personality is only binding upon “the consenting subject”.151 Member States of an 
organization will thus be bound by the status if legal personality is attributed to the entity. The 
ICJ in the Reparations case elaborated that the possession of legal personality implied the 
capability for an entity to avail itself “of obligations incumbent upon its Members”.152 Non-
member States may also choose to be bound it they recognize the organization’s legal person-
ality. In practice, any legal person may recognize the legal status of another entity, but only 
with binding effect upon itself.
153
  
 
The advocates of the subjective theory attribute qualified legal personality to international 
organizations, in the sense that only member States are bound by the legal status, as opposed 
to objective personality.
154
 Basing its theory on the constitution and the intention of its found-
ers, there is an underlying assumption that an organization’s constitution is only binding upon 
its ratifying members.
155
 The only way the legal status of an organization can become valid in 
regards to non-member States is by explicit recognition. 
 
The objective personality is said to be “harder to achieve” as it depends upon the efforts of a 
substantial part of the international community.
156
 However, the effect of the status is of 
greater importance as it is effective upon any “international person with which it is conduct-
ing relations”, unconditional of membership.157 In this sense, an organization with objective 
legal personality operates erga omnes.  
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It is debated whether international organizations can attain objective legal personality in the 
sense that the status is “valid vis-à-vis non-member States which has not recognized the Or-
ganization”.158 Seyersted argues that the question of objective international legal personality 
has been answered affirmatively by the ICJ in the Reparations case in regards to the UN.
159
 
Besides possessing qualified personality, the Court concluded that the UN’s legal personality 
was valid in relation to all other subjects of law, and thus possessing objective international 
legal personality: 
 
“…the Court’s opinion is that fifty States, representing the vast majority of the mem-
bers of the international community, had the power, in conformity with international 
law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective international personality, and 
not merely personality recognized by them alone, together with capacity to bring in-
ternational claims”.160   
 
Certain legal scholars argue that the same reasoning should apply for similar organizations.
161
 
In order to possess objective legal personality, the organization should have a “universal char-
acter” in the sense that so-called “closed international organizations”, for example regional 
organizations, cannot attain objective legal personality.
162
 However, the number of member 
States should not be the decisive factor, but must be seen in context with the character and 
functions of the organization.
163
 However, there are also those who claim that it is far from 
obvious that the argument of the ICJ is applicable towards other IGOs, due to UN’s excep-
tional importance which cannot be transferred immediately to other organizations.
164
 
 
The ICJ Use of Force cases illustrate that international legal personality attributed to an IGO 
not necessarily entails objective legal personality.
165
 The case concerned claims for responsi-
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bility for the use of force by NATO against former Yugoslavia. Instead of bringing a lawsuit 
against the organization as such, Yugoslavia brought claims against the individual NATO 
member States who directly contributed to the use of force. The actions by Yugoslavia, as a 
non-member State of NATO, suggest that NATO is not in the possession of objective interna-
tional legal personality. As NATO is a regional organization, non-member States should in 
principle not be bound by the organization’s international personality, unless it voluntarily 
recognizes the status. 
 
 
3.3.2 Inherent capacities 
Despite organization’s various functions, and thus different capacities as a consequence of 
their possession of legal personality, some question whether international legal personality 
“implies a minimum number of international rights and duties”.166 It is unclear whether the 
rights and duties flow from the international personality, or whether international organiza-
tions only have powers expressly or implied granted to them in its constitution.
167
 The ques-
tion is whether international legal personality implies inherent capacities regardless of the 
organization’s purpose or functions granted by the constitution.  
 
There are different opinions in the literature in regards to possible inherent capacities flowing 
from the concept of legal personality. Some are of the impression that the attribution of legal 
personality does not authorize certain capacities because of the diversity of functions by inter-
national organizations.
168
 On the contrary, other scholars recognize that there may exist a pre-
sumption for inherent capacities as long as the IGOs are in a practical position to perform 
them.
169
  
 
Despite the uncertainties by the legal scholars, the question of legal personality is often men-
tioned in some formal contexts, providing a basis to wonder if certain rights and duties are 
regarded as consequences of international legal personality. 
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3.3.2.1 The capacity to conclude treaties 
The ability to make treaties and enter into binding international agreements is the first right 
often attributed to subjects of international law. It is not disputed that States possess the abil-
ity to create law in light of their legal personality.
170
 The situation is not as straightforward for 
international organizations. 
 
The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties between States and International Organiza-
tions or between International Organizations (hereafter VCLTIO) states in its article 84 that it 
is open to accession “by any international organization which has the capacity to conclude 
treaties”. The article thus presumes that the competence to create law can be possessed by 
international organizations. Although the treaty is not in force, it “acts as a legal and practical 
guide”.171  
 
The UN’s treaty-making power was affirmed in the Reparations case.172 In regards to other 
international organizations, some are of the impression that an entity’s status as a legal person 
“does not necessarily imply power to make treaties”, but can be used to “infer general treat-
ing-making capacity”.173 Others are of the opinion that:  
 
“…there is a strong presumption in the absence of contrary indication that such pow-
ers are enjoyed by international organizations qua international persons, because they 
are necessary for the discharge of their functions and the fulfilment of their purpos-
es”.174  
 
The starting point in regards to an organization’s capacity to make treaties is their constituent 
instrument.
175
 In lack of an explicit capacity to make treaties, such a right can be established 
through an interpretation of the constituent instrument or their implied powers.
176
 The deci-
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sive factor will be whether the right is necessary for the organization’s ability to effectively 
perform its functions.
177
 As stated in the Preamble of VCLTIO: 
 
“…international organizations possess the capacity to conclude treaties, which is nec-
essary for the exercise of their functions and the fulfilment of their purposes”.  
 
The primary view today is that IGOs can enter into international agreements and treaties when 
the text of the potential Convention allows for it.
178
  
 
 
3.3.2.2 Competence to bring an international claim 
The competence to bring an international claim is a frequently mentioned consequence which 
flows from the possession of international legal personality.
179
  The ICJ Reparation case de-
fines ‘international claim’ as: 
 
“… the capacity to resort to the customary methods recognized by international law 
for the establishment, the presentation and the settlement of claims. Among these 
methods may be mentioned protest, request for an enquiry, negotiation and request for 
a submission to an arbitral tribunal or to the Court…”180  
 
The Court held unanimously that the UN had the capacity to bring an international claim 
against both member and non-member States, due to their possession of legal personality and 
the ability to effectively perform their functions.
181
 They clearly emphasized that this compe-
tence presupposes that both the claimant and the claimed entity are “subjects of international 
law”.182 In regards to other international organizations, scholars claim that those IGOs pos-
sessing international legal personality have an inherent right to bring international claim 
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against their members.
183
 As long as their legal personality is objective, the competence to 
bring international claim is valid in regards to non-member States to the same extent as the 
member States.   
 
 
3.3.2.3 Privileges and immunities from national jurisdiction 
In order to exercise their functions effectively and independently, organizations can be grant-
ed certain privileges and immunities. Privileges and immunities of organizations can derive 
from either their constitutive instrument, multilateral agreements or headquarter agree-
ments.
184
 Contrary to the capacity to espouse claims which depends on the existence of legal 
personality, the existence of immunities “is not conditioned on the separate legal personality 
of the entity concerned”.185 States can within their own jurisdiction grant immunities to any 
organization regardless of their international legal status.
186
 Privileges and immunities are 
thus often a result of the organization’s nature rather than an inherent power applicable to all 
legal persons.
187
   
 
 
3.3.2.4 Responsibility under international law 
A consequence of legal personality separate from its member States is the possibility for the 
organization as such to be held responsible for its actions. According to ICJ: 
 
“International organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound 
by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, un-
der their constitutions or under agreements to which they are parties”.188  
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IGOs are subordinate to international law, meaning that the entities are “partly made up of 
international rules” which they are bound to follow.189 The notion is that IGOs will be bound 
by international legal obligations in the same matter as their founding member-States, and to 
the extent their functions make it possible.
190
 ILC’s Draft Articles of 2011 article 3 states that 
“every internationally wrongful act by an organization entails the international responsibility”. 
Furthermore, the Draft Articles acknowledge IGOs’ responsibility for breaches of internation-
al obligations.
191
 As the Draft Articles are not adopted, they can only be used as guidelines. 
 
Despite the pending adoption of a treaty concerning the responsibility of international organi-
zations, it is generally recognized in the international community that a logical consequence 
of legal personality is responsibility and liability for their obligations and actions.
192
 With this 
follows the possibility for an IGO with legal personality to have international claims brought 
against it.
193
  
 
 
3.4 Preliminary conclusion 
 
3.4.1 The criterions 
Based on the previous paragraphs, it is appropriate to conclude that it is not entirely clear 
what criterions that need to be fulfilled in order to possess international legal personality. 
Overall, taking into account the various arguments from the prominent legal scholars, interna-
tional legal personality does not depend on precise and clear-cut criteria. The attribution of 
legal personality to organizations is rather based on a discretionary overall analysis, where 
“the primary test is functional”.194 There are, however, certain requirements that should be 
used as guidelines for the evaluation. The organization should possess and exercise certain 
international rights and duties independent from its members, either expressly through its 
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constitutive instruments or implicitly intended through practice. The international rights and 
duties and the degree of independence are related to the intention of the founders, as the ob-
jective circumstances around the establishment of the organization will reflect the intention 
behind the establishment.
195
 Alongside with the functions of the organization, recognition by 
the international community should to some extent be present. The attribution of legal person-
ality to organizations seems to be granted to those entities the international community is in 
need of, making recognition an important factor.  
 
Based on the ICJ Reparations case and subsequent judicial decisions and judicial teaching, 
the following four aspects will be used as requirements or legal guidelines in the thesis’ fur-
ther process: 
 
1. Independence from States and other legal persons. 
2. Existence and capability to exercise international legal powers. 
3. The intention of the founders by delegated or implied legal personality. 
4. Explicit or implicit recognition by other subjects of international law. 
 
 
3.4.2 The consequences 
In regards to the validity of international legal personality, the starting point should be quali-
fied personality. An international organization with international legal personality will thus in 
principle only be able to enforce its rights and duties upon its members.
196
 However, it is evi-
dent that international organizations potentially can attain objective legal personality, as with 
the UN. Objective legal personality can either be explicitly mentioned in their constituent 
instrument, or flow from the organization’s functional position. 
 
As to the consequences of international legal personality, the question of inherent powers is 
depended on two factors: the possession of legal personality and whether certain rights and 
obligations are necessary in order for the organization to effectively perform their functions. 
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As with the concept of legal personality, any possible inherent powers is a relative question, 
depending on the organization in concern. 
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4 The doctrine of legal personality applied to 
ICRC 
 
4.1 Applicable approaches 
 
4.1.1 The organization’s structure 
It is evident that the ICRC is an organization with a humanitarian purpose. It is however, un-
clear what type of organization the entity is, an IGO or an NGO. The distinction is in principle 
important, as it is generally recognized that the former, but not the latter can possess interna-
tional legal personality.  
 
Initially, the ICRC was a humanitarian organization established by five Swiss citizens. The 
absence of involvement by States made it an NGO. In 1915, the ICRC gained national legal 
personality under the Swiss Confederation as it “became a formal association under Swiss 
civil law”.197 Since then, its legal status has evolved and changed. The signing of an agree-
ment between Switzerland and the ICRC in 1993 conferred to the ICRC privileges and im-
munities normally granted to international governmental organization. It has been argued that 
ICRC from that point is to be regarded as an IGO, not an NGO.
198
 There are prominent argu-
ments for the organization being both an NGO and an IGO. 
 
In support of regarding ICRC as an NGO is their membership and funding. The organization 
has individuals as their members, and is independent of State affiliation.
199
 Furthermore, the 
organization’s funding is voluntary, contrary to IGO’s were funding usually is mandatory.200 
When it comes to regarding ICRC as an IGO, its role and mandate in the international com-
munity and the organization’s organs make it “appear more akin to an intergovernmental or-
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ganization”.201 ICRC is equipped with several organs functioning as plenary, executive and 
administrative organs, a feature known for IGOs.
202
 
 
The perception internally in the organization is that the ICRC is neither an IGO nor an NGO. 
The Movement Statutes article 5 no. 1 states that the ICRC is “an independent humanitarian 
organization having a status of its own”. Rather than placing ICRC in one of the groups, the 
organization can be seen as an entity with a hybrid nature.
203
 It has “a distinctive duality” in 
the sense that the organization should not be categorized as either an NGO or an IGO.
204
 The 
organization is often referred to as having a legal status sui generis, meaning it is unique in its 
characteristic and not easily categorized.
205
 The unique nature of ICRC does not imply that 
the legal status as a subject of international law is excluded given that the international com-
munity has accepted that the possession of legal personality is not limited to the normal enti-
ties; States and IGOs. The international community has opened up for the possibility for sui 
generis entities to possess international legal personality, entities such as the Holy See and the 
Sovereign Order of Malta.
206
  
 
 
4.1.2 The theories 
Purely based on the subjective theory, it could be argued that ICRC is in the possession of 
international legal personality as the actions and statements by the organization indicate an 
implied intention to have international legal personality. Despite the lack of an expressed at-
tribution of international legal personality in its statutes, the organization has acted and exer-
cised its powers at the international plane as though it is a subject of international law. How-
ever, the intention of the founders of ICRC cannot be decisive in regards to their legal status. 
As ICRC is established by individual, the notion that States can grant international legal per-
sonality to the organizations they create, is poorly suited in this context as States are not 
members of ICRC. Allowing for individuals to freely establish an organization and granting 
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the entity with international legal personality, would lead to an uncontrollable and unsolicited 
expansion of the notion of international legal personality.  
 
Regardless of the intention of its founders, the objective theory could possibly lead to the 
conclusion that ICRC possesses international legal personality, where the objective criteria is 
met. Based on the two prominent theories on legal personality in section 3.2.1, the decisive 
criteria for the attribution of legal personality to the ICRC seems to be an overall judgement 
where both the intention and objective criterions need to be fulfilled. 
 
 
4.1.3 Conclusion 
ICRC is a sui generis entity. It is neither an IGO nor an NGO. Based on its unique role, one 
could assume that the legal basis for ICRC’s possession of legal personality is of a completely 
different character than for other organizations. However, ICRC’s similarities to IGOs imply 
that the traditional doctrine of legal personality developed by legal practice and teaching 
should be applied to clarify the legal status of ICRC, to the extent that it is possible.  
 
The following sections will account for the various elements that are often cited as a basis for 
the ICRC’s status as a subject of international law. Under each item, it will be clarified what 
criteria that are met based on the frequently employed directional lines for legal personality, 
cited in section 3.4.1. 
 
 
4.2 The legal basis for ICRC’s status as a legal person 
 
4.2.1 International mandate 
As already portrayed under section 2.2, the ICRC is entrusted with a wide international man-
date, enabling it to participate in the international community. The mandate is often referred 
to as the legal basis for ICRC’s possession of international legal personality.207 What is often 
failed to mention, is why the international mandate granted to ICRC leads to the conclusion 
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that ICRC possesses international legal personality. There is no explicit mention of legal per-
sonality in either of the legal instruments, and as a result the answer lies in an application of 
the traditional doctrine of legal personality. In relation to the applicable conditions for interna-
tional organization’s possession of legal personality highlighted in section 3.4.1, there is basis 
for pointing out certain clear-cut evidence to suggest that the mandate may have created the 
basis for the ICRC’s legal basis. 
 
 
4.2.1.1 International rights and duties 
Consequently, the international mandate grants ICRC international rights and duties. The Ge-
neva Conventions and its Additional Protocols have entrusted ICRC with a variety of func-
tions that enable the organization to possess and exercise rights and duties relating to the pro-
tection of victims in armed conflict and the guarding of IHL. The rights and duties prescribed 
in the mandate give ICRC a unique function within IHL. It is first and foremost the functions 
of ICRC that are used to justify the attribution of legal personality to the organization.
208
 
Based on an analogy from ICJ Reparation case it can be argued that ICRC cannot fulfil its 
functions and purpose under international law unless it is in the possession of legal personali-
ty. Amongst other, the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (hereafter ICTR) has con-
cluded that “…the functions attributed to it by the Geneva Conventions have resulted in the 
acquisition by the ICRC of an international status.”209 On the other hand, Gazzini claims the 
international mandate neither presupposes nor confers international legal personality. In sup-
port of his claim he argues that if a High Contracting Party to the Geneva Conventions and 
Protocols denies ICRC access to prisoners of war, “it commits a violation of the right of the 
other party to the conflict…not of the ICRC”.210 The statement implies that the ICRC cannot 
enforce the rights granted to them under IHL, because it does not hold rights and obligations 
in international law. The statement is important in the debate, but should not be decisive. It is 
evident that ICRC possesses international rights, such as the right of initiative under common 
article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and the right to visit POWs. Gazzini’s argument might be 
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in relation to ICRC’s international competence, an issue that should not be confused with the 
organization’s possession of international rights and duties. 
 
 
4.2.1.2 Implicit recognition 
The mandate conferred upon ICRC in both the Geneva Conventions and the Movement’s 
Statutes is a result of a cooperation of virtually every nation. In this sense, the international 
mandate granted to ICRC is based on the international community’s consensus. The Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereafter ICTY) stated in Simic et al that:  
 
“… by accepting to be bound by the Geneva Conventions, the States party to them have 
agreed to the special role and mandate of the ICRC”.211 
 
The international powers entrusted to ICRC pursuant to the Conventions, indicates an implicit 
recognition of ICRC’s international legal personality.212  
 
An implied recognition of ICRC as a subject of international law is also to be found in the 
International Criminal Court’s (hereafter ICC) Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Rule 73 
acknowledges ICRC’s international legal personality, based on the international mandate con-
ferred upon it.
213
 ICC has thus reaffirmed and recognized that the mandate gives legal grounds 
for attributing legal personality to ICRC. As ICC is founded by States, the acknowledgement 
strengthens the impression of State recognition regarding ICRC’s international legal personal-
ity.  
 
 
4.2.2 Judicial decisions 
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4.2.2.1 ICTY Trial Chamber Prosecutor v Simic et al 
Prior to the trial against individuals allegedly causing serious violations of IHL during the 
Yugoslav wars from 1991, the Prosecution submitted a motion as to whether a former em-
ployee of the ICRC could be called as a witness to give evidence of facts proving the guilt of 
“certain of the accused”.214 It was undisputed that the witness itself contacted the Prosecution 
and wanted to testify during the trail. The disputed issue concerned the ICRC’s right to confi-
dentiality, being their right to “not disclose to third parties information that comes to the 
knowledge of its personnel in the performance of their functions”.215  
 
To settle the dispute, the Court found it necessary to initially clarify the legal status of the 
ICRC. It should be noted that both parties agreed that the ICRC had international legal per-
sonality.
216
 The Court declared: 
 
“It is widely acknowledged that the ICRC, an independent humanitarian organization, 
enjoys a special status in international law, based on the mandate conferred upon it by 
the international community. The Trial Chamber notes that the functions and tasks of 
the ICRC are directly derived from international law, that is, the Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocols”.217  
 
In a footnote to this statement, the Chamber specified its view stating the following:  
 
“It is generally acknowledged that the ICRC, although a private organization under 
Swiss law, has an international legal personality”.218  
 
 
The possession of legal personality implied that ICRC was capable of possessing international 
rights, in this case the right to confidentiality. The ICTY explicitly acknowledged ICRC’s 
status as a subject of international law, without further discussion or analysis. The Court did 
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not clarify the legal status of ICRC, but merely recognized it. However, the decision does 
amplify that the organization’s legal status is based on the mandate granted to ICRC. The de-
cision is furthermore an example of an international claim being brought on ICRC. Based on 
the opinion by the Court in the ICJ Reparations case, such an act presupposes that both par-
ties are subjects of international law.
219
   
 
It is evident that the decision entails an explicit acknowledgement of ICRC’s international 
legal personality. However, it is not immediately clear what significance the statements have. 
ICTY is an ad hoc tribunal for the purpose of prosecuting those who committed war crimes 
during the Yugoslav wars from 1991.
220
 Clapham argues that the ICTY is not an “authorita-
tive decision-making body”.221 As a consequence the statements “can only represent an ad 
hoc declaration of the situation rather than a constitutive act creating personality”.222 Despite 
it being an ad hoc tribunal, the explicit recognition by legally knowledgeable representatives 
of international law in a legally binding document cannot be regarded as anything other than a 
statement of great importance and persuasive strength. Although not authoritative, the state-
ments are without a doubt a vital part of the overall analysis. According to ICJ Article 38, 
“judicial decisions” are regarded as a legal source. Statements ratio decidendi in judicial deci-
sions will thus be of general relevance in regards to the law in question.  
 
 
4.2.2.2 Decisions by the ICTR 
Subsequent case law has significance as to whether ICTY’s decision is convincing. Unlike 
most national legal systems, international law has formally “no system of ‘precedent’”.223 
However, practice has shown that: 
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“…decisions of the ICJ and other international courts and tribunals are important as 
they are often treated as providing authoritative interpretations of the law in question, 
and followed as authority in later cases”.224  
 
Several decisions from the ICTR support the statements by ICTY regarding ICRC’s legal sta-
tus and the organization’s capability to possess international powers.  
 
In the motion for inadmissibility of a former volunteer of ICRC in the case against Nyirama-
suhuko ICRC did not oppose to the testimony, meaning the Court did not need to take a stand 
on the legal issue. However, the decision does confirm that both the Prosecution and the De-
fence agreed that employees of ICRC had a right to confidentiality, and the dispute concerned 
whether volunteers had the same right.
225
 In Prosecutor v Tharcisse Muvunyi ICTR confirmed 
that international law has granted ICRC “the exceptional privilege of non-disclosure of infor-
mation” relating to ICRC’s activities, and as a result the “acquisition by the ICRC of an inter-
national status”.226 
 
The fact that subsequent practice from international courts follows ICTY’s decision provides 
a greater basis for claiming that the decision in practice has the effect of a precedent. 
 
 
4.2.3 Headquarters agreements 
The ICRC has concluded headquarter agreements with more than 80 States around the world, 
thus conducting diplomatic relations with States.
227
 The agreements are created with the aim 
of setting a legal framework for “the independent action of ICRC delegates and the ICRC 
itself” in each individual country.228   
 
                                                 
224
 I.c. 
225
 ICTR Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko  section 1 and 2 
226 ICTR Prosecutor v Tharcisse Muvunyi section 15 and 16 
227
 ICRC website <http://www.icrc.org/eng/where-we-work/index.jsp>, ICRC Annual Report 2008 p 40 
228
 Rossi (2010) p 40 
46 
 
The very first headquarter agreement was signed between ICRC and the Government of the 
Cameroon in 1973 and lay the foundation for the agreements to come.
229
 Perhaps the most 
commonly known headquarter agreement is the one concluded with Switzerland, where 
ICRC’s relationship with Switzerland was specified in an agreement concluded on 19 March 
1993. As the agreements are negotiated with each individual country, there is no standard 
headquarter agreement. However, most of them contain similar provisions regarding the 
recognition of ICRC’s international legal personality. The ICRC has, based on previous 
agreements, developed a Standard Proposed ICRC Headquarter Agreement, which is used as 
guidelines for the individual agreement.
230
  
 
What is exceptional about these agreements is that States usually only conclude similar 
agreements with IGOs. As ICRC is a hybrid organization, a prerequisite for States upon the 
concluding of the headquarter agreements is the assimilation of ICRC to an IGO.
231
 By enter-
ing into agreements normally signed with IGOs, States chose to treat ICRC as an IGO and 
thereby allowing the organization to take part in international relations as a legal person.
232
 
The assimilation of ICRC to an IGO is in itself a strong indicator that ICRC is regarded as a 
subject of international law, as IGO’s are generally recognized as possessing international 
legal personality. 
 
The headquarter agreements will often include an expressly recognition of ICRC’s legal per-
sonality.
233
 Article 1 in the agreement with Switzerland recognizes “the international juridical 
personality and the legal capacity” of the ICRC.234 As the headquarter agreements often in-
clude a provision of ICRC’s legal personality, the individual State has expressly recognized 
ICRC’s legal status.  
 
Besides the explicit recognition by States, the agreements furthermore reaffirm the organiza-
tion’s independence. Implicitly, the immunities and privileges often granted through the 
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agreements will contribute to the maintenance of ICRC’s independence.235 Besides the im-
plicit conferment of ICRC’s independence, an explicit mention of the organization’s character 
is not unusual.  Article 2 in the agreement with Switzerland explicitly guarantees “the ICRC 
independence”. 
 
 
4.2.4 Recognition by the United Nations and other international 
organizations 
 
4.2.4.1 Observer status at the United Nations 
The UN General Assembly invited the ICRC to be honoured with a permanent observer status 
in October 1990.
236
 The General Assembly’s 138 Member States passed the resolution unan-
imously.
237
 The invitation to act as an observer was an “exceptional gesture” and signalized 
the “international community’s willingness to accept the ICRC’s function within the UN”.238  
 
Prior to the new observer status, the ICRC, alongside with several NGOs, “had consultative 
status with the Economic and Social Council” pursuant to the UN Charter article 71.239 The 
consultative status did not entitle the holder “to attend the meetings and conferences of the 
main UN bodies”, a matter that required special invitation “to attend individual meetings”.240  
With the change from consultative to observer status in 1990, ICRC’s new status has its ad-
vantages. Unlike before, the new observer status allows for ICRC to attend meetings and con-
ferences arranged by the main UN bodies on a “permanent representation”, as well as the 
right to “speak on its own initiative”.241 Overall, the status allows the ICRC to “participate in 
a more active and visible way in the work of the UN”, although they are not entitled to 
vote.
242
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There are presumably three reasons behind the UN’s decision to invite the ICRC to take part 
in its proceedings as an observer. Firstly, the General Assembly emphasized “the mandate 
conferred” to ICRC under the Geneva Conventions.243 Secondly, the invitation had a connec-
tion with the organization’s “special role… in international humanitarian relations”.244 Lastly, 
the granting was a part of the overall wish to enhance the co-operation between the UN and 
ICRC. 
 
The question of interest in this thesis is whether an invitation for observer status at the UN 
signalizes that the entity is regarded as having international legal personality. In order to an-
swer this question, we must first look at which other entities have been granted observer sta-
tus at the UN. 
 
Besides States and certain national liberation movements, observer status is usually granted to 
IGOs, such as the European Union and the African Union.
245
 Besides IGOs, a total of five so-
called “other entities” have been granted observer status at the UN, amongst them the ICRC, 
the International Olympic Committee and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies.
246
 According to the information available at the UN website, no NGO 
have been invited to participate as observer in the UN. The entities having observer status 
thus tend to be the ones possessing international legal personality, or at least the ones usually 
accepted as having the opportunity to be regarded as a subject of international law.  
 
International legal personality is in all probability not a prerequisite for observer status at the 
UN. However, the status has so far not been granted to any organization whose international 
legal personality is entirely out of the question. For instance, the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), lacks international legal personality, as it is not a “full-
fledged international organization”, but is granted observer status at the UN.247 Still, OSCE 
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has attempted to address its legal status, so far without success, indicating that the organiza-
tion possibly could be acknowledged as a subject of international law.  
 
As for the ICRC, there is no conclusive answer in regards to whether the UN at the time of the 
granting considered the organization to be a subject of international law. Legal scholars are 
torn between the significance of the observer status in relation to the question of ICRC’s pos-
session of legal personality. Gazzini claims that the observer status is without significance to 
ICRC’s legal status in the international community.248 Koenig on the other side argues that 
the observer status was granted to ICRC because of its international mandate, its conclusion 
of several headquarters agreements and consultative status in several international bodies, 
enabling the organization to possess a “functional international personality”.249  Looking at 
the characteristics of the other observers as well as UN’s reasons for granting ICRC observer 
status, it is appropriate to consider the observer status as a strengthening argument for ICRC’s 
possession of international legal personality. The observer status is an implicit recognition by 
the international community of ICRC’s unique legal status due to its mandate and connection 
with international legal persons. Based on the traditional legal doctrine, the recognition by the 
UN is an argument in favor of ICRC being a subject of international law. 
 
 
4.2.4.2 Co-operation agreements 
Beside its diplomatic relations with States, ICRC has concluded several co-operation agree-
ments with various international organizations. The co-operation agreements are signed in 
different regions of the world, and across religion and cultures. The agreements aims to “in-
crease and improve” the cooperation between the organizations, by opening up for participa-
tion of representatives as observers at conferences and meetings, as well facilitate for the ex-
change of information and carry out joint activities.
250
 ICRC has concluded co-operation 
agreements which amongst others the Organization of African Unity (1992), Organization of 
American States (1996) and the League of Arab States (1999).
251
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These kinds of agreements are usually concluded between international organizations with 
international legal personality. The same logic as with States’ recognition of ICRC’s legal 
personality in the individual headquarters agreements, is applicable also in regards to the co-
operation agreements. By concluding agreements with ICRC, international organizations have 
treated ICRC as an IGO rather than an NGO.
252
 Hence, the agreements can be viewed as an 
implicit recognition by the different IGOs in regards to the legal personality of ICRC.  
 
 
4.2.5 Conclusion 
The previous sections have described the most commonly stated reasons for ICRC’s legal 
status. It remains to reach a possible conclusion regarding the first sub-issue of the thesis, 
namely whether the ICRC possesses international legal personality. 
 
Keeping in mind the criterions that are applicable in the thesis, several arguments support 
ICRC’s possession of international legal personality. The intention of the founders is for 
ICRC to be a subject of international law and therefore able to participate in the international 
legal community. Despite the lack of an expressed intention to have international legal per-
sonality, the intention is implied through ICRC’s subsequent action and practice. It is fur-
thermore evident that ICRC is an international organization independent from States and other 
legal persons. The element of independence is both confirmed and enhanced in the headquar-
ters and co-operation agreements. The international mandate, strengthened by the ICTY Simic 
et al case, leaves no doubt as to the existence and the capacity to exercise international rights 
and duties. In analogy to ICJ’s subsumption in the Reparations case the ICRC is intended to 
exercise and enjoy, and is to this day exercising and enjoying functions and rights that can 
only be explained on the basis of the possession of international legal personality. In light of 
the Court’s decision in this case, the ICRC is not able to carry out its mandate conferred to it 
by States under IHL if it is void of international legal personality.
253
 Furthermore, ICRC has 
on multiple occasions been recognized as possessing international legal personality, due to 
both the element of trust and the organization’s resemblance to IGOs. A commonly stated 
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argument in legal theory is the ICRC possesses international legal personality “because states 
have tacitly recognized it as an international person”.254 The ratification of the Geneva Con-
ventions and their Additional Protocols, as well as the conclusion of individual agreements 
with ICRC indicate that “states must have recognized the ICRC as an international person by 
implication”.255  
 
It is today generally accepted that the ICRC possesses international legal personality, although 
the status is often qualified as limited, functional or sui generis with reference to its interna-
tional mandate.
256
  
 
 
4.3 The legal consequences of the attribution of legal 
personality to the ICRC 
In the ICTY Prosecutor v Simic, the parties did not dispute on the legal personality of ICRC. 
It was however a fact that:  
 
“…the Prosecution and the ICRC disagree as to the consequences that flow from the 
ICRC’s status”.257  
 
Despite the recognition as a subject of international law, the consequences thereof have not 
been clarified. Nor do the organization’s constitutional instruments provide indications as to 
the consequences of the legal personality. The following sections will provide thoughts on 
what consequences that could be a natural result of international recognition of ICRC’s legal 
status.  
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4.3.1 Qualified vs. objective legal personality 
The validity of organizations’ international legal personality, and the distinction between 
qualified and objective personality are vital parts of the notion of international legal personali-
ty. However, the discussion is not easily applicable to ICRC. Contrary to IGOs, the members 
of ICRC are individuals, not States. Based on the applicable doctrine of international legal 
personality, States should therefore in principle not automatically be bound by ICRC’s inter-
national legal personality without expressly recognition. 
 
A natural reasoning for ICRC could be that the validity of its legal status applies to the High 
Contracting Parties of the Geneva Conventions, given that the international mandate to a large 
extent is the legal basis for ICRC’s status as a subject of international law. As these conven-
tions are considered universal, one could argue that ICRC’s legal personality also applies to 
non-member States of the Geneva Convention. The Geneva Conventions are binding on every 
nation, member States as well as non-member States, as international customary law, impli-
cating that also ICRC’s international legal personality is valid on all nations. ICRC’s mandate 
is furthermore established through the Movement’s Statutes, which is developed at Interna-
tional Conferences with the participation of the High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Con-
ventions. The participation by the High Contracting Parties at the International Conferences 
strengthens the argument that ICRC has objective legal personality, as virtually all the world’s 
nations are party to the Geneva Conventions. 
 
To date there is no clear answer as to the validity of ICRC’s legal status in regards to other 
subjects of international law. In remains to see if the issue will be resolved. 
 
 
4.3.2 Rights under international law 
 
4.3.2.1 Competence to create law  
Contrary to the generally accepted notion of an inherent treaty-making power granted to IGOs 
with legal personality, ICRC’s competence to create law is a controversial issue.   
 
A prominent argument against ICRC’s competence to create law is the organization’s lack of 
accession to international conventions. To illustrate one can mention the Geneva Conventions 
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of 1949. ICRC tried to conclude the conventions in 1930, but opposition from States resulted 
in delays, as “states controlled the codification of IHL”.258 Despite ICRC’s direct involvement 
in the elaboration of humanitarian treaties, the organization is not a signatory to any interna-
tional convention, contrary to other international organizations such as the UN. On the other 
side, ICRC has a tremendous active part in the development of IHL and the drafting of the 
conventional instruments in this specific area of international law. The existence of IHL is to 
a large extent the result of ICRC’s initiative and preparation.259 The extensive initiative, prep-
aration, participation and encouraging by ICRC in the treaty-making process in IHL, suggest 
that ICRC “has contributed directly and substantively to the lawmaking process”.260 However, 
the direct involvement by ICRC in the treaty-making process does not automatically mean 
that the organization has treaty-making capacity. An element of ICRC’s participation that 
most strongly suggests that ICRC has treaty-making power is ICRC’s study on customary 
IHL. Certain legal scholars have argued that ICRC’s activities, hereunder the study, “amount 
to State practice” and could be binding as customary international law.261 Others are of the 
opinion that assessments from the ICRC “are not legally binding upon States or Tribunals”, 
thereby precluding the possibility for ICRC’s studies to have law-making force.262  
 
Furthermore, ICRC has concluded headquarter and co-operation agreements without a specif-
ic legal basis for this capacity. According to Crawford, such a persistent practice can in prin-
ciple create “a general treaty-making capacity”.263 According to VLCTIO Article 2 no. 1 a) 
these agreements are considered to be a “treaty” within the Convention’s wording, as they are 
concluded between States and ICRC as an “international organization” or “between interna-
tional organizations”. 
 
A possible conclusion is that the ICRC has the competence to conclude treaties as long as it 
falls within its field of competence. As long as the treaties in concern revolve around ICRC’s 
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mandate in IHL, the organization will due to is legal personality have a limited treaty-making 
capacity.  
 
 
4.3.2.2 Competence to bring an international claim 
In accordance with its international mandate, the ICRC has adopted guidelines concerning the 
organization’s action in the event of violations of IHL.264 According to the guidelines’ section 
1.General rule, ICRC has the right to take “all appropriate steps” to put an end to violations 
on its own initiative. Although not explicitly mentioned, a natural understanding of the word-
ing indicates that ICRC in pursuance of the guidelines’ section 1.General rule has the compe-
tence to bring an international claim against other subjects of law where it would be consid-
ered a natural reaction to the violation. 
 
Apart from ICRC’s guidelines for action in the event of violations of IHL, the organization’s 
own practice suggest that ICRC possesses the capability to bring international claims. Particu-
larly one episode illustrates ICRC’s competence to bring international claims. During a UN 
intervention in Zaire in 1961, an ICRC delegate together with two Red Cross volunteers were 
killed in a Red Cross ambulance in Katanga, allegedly by UN troops in violation of IHL.
265
 
Following the incident, ICRC decided to submit a claim against the UN for compensation for 
UN’s violation of IHL. A commission of inquiry was established, and without admitting re-
sponsibility, the UN paid compensation to the ICRC.
266
  
 
It seems natural that ICRC as a matter of principle is entitled to bring international claims. 
ICRC delegates are deployed in many operations, were certain circumstances could give a 
cause to raise a claim. The litigation avenues are feasible open, but are in practice significant-
ly restrictive, as it would be counterproductive to ICRC’s role and mandate. As ICRC oper-
ates under the fundamental principles of neutrality and impartiality, it is questionable whether 
ICRC will make use of this ability, although it in principle has the capacity to bring interna-
tional claims.  
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4.3.2.3 Privileges and immunity 
As stated under section 3.3.2.3, the granting of privileges and immunities to organizations is 
not a result of their possession of international legal personality. It is rather a consequence of 
States’ sovereignty to provide rights to and enter into agreements with entities of their own 
free will. ICRC is granted privileges and immunities by several States, not as a consequence 
of their status as subjects of international law, but due to States’ own choice.  
 
 
4.3.2.4 The right to confidentiality 
It is today an undisputed feature of the ICRC to enjoy “an absolute privilege to withhold in-
formation”.267 There are seemingly three legal sources which recognize the organization’s 
right to confidentiality: ICTY Trial Chamber Prosecutor v Simic et al, ICC Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence rule 73 and headquarter agreements. 
268
  
 
In the 1999 decision by the ICTY Trial Chamber, ICRC argued that the principle of confiden-
tiality “is a key element on which it needs to rely in order to be able to carry out its man-
date”.269 The Chamber found this argument to be supported by State practice. In its conclu-
sion, the Chamber found after an overall analysis that a privilege of non-disclosure for the 
ICRC was “necessary for the effective discharge by the ICRC of its mandate”.270 With respect 
to the parties to the Geneva Convention and the Protocols, the Chamber concluded that “the 
ICRC has a right to insist on such non-disclosure” as a matter of customary international law 
due to its possession of legal personality.
271
  
 
Rule 73 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence codified ICRC’s right to confidentiality 
in 2000. Pursuant to Rule 73 sections 4-6, the Court cannot impose upon those who work or 
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have worked for the ICRC to witness or submit information gathered during their employ-
ment. Apart from ICRC, no other organization, neither IGOs nor NGOs, is granted this privi-
lege, which in turn confirms the uniqueness of ICRC.
272
  
 
Trough headquarter agreements, States can explicitly give their consent to ICRC’s right to 
confidentiality. The degree of ICRC’s right to non-disclosure varies as no headquarter agree-
ment is the same. However, the standard provisions for headquarter agreement proposed by 
the organization contain the right to confidentiality, indicating that the right usually will be 
included in the agreements.
273
 Both the agreement with Switzerland and Australia acknowl-
edges ICRC’s right to confidentiality.274  
 
 
4.3.3 Obligations under international law 
 
4.3.3.1 Responsibility under international law 
As stated in section 3.3.2.4, it is generally recognized that IGOs can be held responsible for 
violations of international law, as a consequence of their international legal personality and 
founding by States. Unlike IGOs, ICRC is not founded by States, and in that matter not neces-
sarily bound by international law. The question is whether the notion can be used analogously 
to the ICRC. 
 
The fact that ICRC is an entity capable of participating in international law implies that a pos-
sibility to be held responsible is the “price to pay”.275 Given that ICRC is often being assimi-
lated with IGOs, it is likely that the same reasoning should apply regarding ICRC’s responsi-
bility for its international wrongful acts. The reasoning implies that the ILC Draft Articles is 
applicable as ICRC is granted international legal personality. It would furthermore be incon-
sistent with the organization’s purpose and function if the ICRC could not be held accounta-
ble for their illegal actions. It would weaken the organization’s confidence and reputation if 
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violations of international law by the ICRC do not have legal consequences. The legal status 
of ICRC thus entails that it is not beyond the realms of possibility that ICRC could be liable 
for wrongful acts or failed duty of care by its delegates. 
 
 
4.4 The significance of the attribution 
It remains to consider whether the attribution of international legal personality has any signif-
icance. The relevant question is whether the status has value beyond what is already resulting 
from international conventions and agreements. Two aspects will be emphasized in order to 
portray the independent significance of ICRC’s recognition as a subject of international law. 
 
 
4.4.1 The privilege of non-disclosure 
The attribution of international legal personality has independent significance for ICRC’s 
right to confidentiality. Where such a right is not recognized in an individual headquarter 
agreement, it will still exist by virtue of the organization’s legal status. Take for example 
Norway, which has not entered into a headquarter agreement with the ICRC. If Norway were 
to demand to receive sensitive information from the ICRC, the organization would not have 
the right to not disclose the information unless it is regarded as a subject of international law. 
The attribution of legal personality enables ICRC’s to decline to give evidence due to the 
right’s basis in customary international law, where the right to confidentiality is not granted in 
a headquarter agreement. 
 
The granting of international legal personality and the privilege of non-disclosure of infor-
mation is generally “in the very interest of the victims the ICRC seeks to protect and as-
sist”.276 Envision the situation at Guantanamo Bay. The information and insight gathered by 
ICRC delegates through visitation and interviewing will by virtue of ICRC’s right to confi-
dentiality entail that the detainees often will remain anonymous and that ICRC will be reluc-
tant to share the information they acquire. Conversations with organizations that do not pos-
sess this right could possibly make prisoners more restrained in the information they provide.  
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ICTR confirmed in Prosecutor v Tharcisse Muvunyi that international law has granted ICRC 
“the exceptional privilege of non-disclosure of information” relating to ICRC’s activities.277 
The Court furthermore pointed out that “such privilege is not granted to national Red Cross 
societies”, clearly signalizing the significance of ICRC’s right to confidentiality.278 Where 
information is gathered as a volunteer for a national Red Cross society, the right to confiden-
tiality does not apply, contrary to information gathered by ICRC delegates. The privilege of 
non-disclosure thus emphasizes the importance of the efforts performed by ICRC delegates. 
The right to confidentiality enables ICRC delegates to perform their duties without the fear of 
having to disclose the information they possess. 
 
 
4.4.2 The possibility of expanded competence 
The attribution of international legal personality has furthermore individual significance as the 
status implies a possibility for ICRC to be granted additional international rights and duties, 
which would not be possible without the status. The status implies that ICRC has the possibil-
ity to be party to international Conventions, such as the ILC Responsibility of International 
Organizations if the draft articles are subject to a treaty opening for entering. The legal status 
furthermore entails that the ICRC in principle can be held accountable for their international 
actions, as well as take legal proceedings against other subjects of international law. These 
rights and duties stem from ICRC’s international legal personality, as opposed to international 
agreements. 
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5 Concluding remarks 
Throughout the thesis, it has been elucidated that the international community today generally 
recognize IGOs as subjects of international law, contrary to NGOs. The problematic issue in 
the thesis has been that ICRC, although an international organization, does not fit either cate-
gory. It is rather described as a hybrid organization, a unique or sui generis entity. Despite the 
lack of categorization of the ICRC, the thesis has found it appropriate to apply the traditional 
doctrine of international legal personality, due to ICRC’s similarities with IGOs. Based on an 
analysis of the criteria for international legal personality applied to ICRC, the thesis has con-
cluded that several arguments support the notion of ICRC being a subject of international law. 
The possession of international rights and duties has its legal basis in the international man-
date and the ICTY Simic case. Furthermore, ICRC acts independent from States or other sub-
jects of international law, a feature which is verified in both the Geneva Conventions and the 
individual headquarter agreements. 
 
However, the international recognition suffers from a clear weakness, as it legally speaking is 
weakly justified. Despite clear statements about ICRC’s possession of international legal per-
sonality, there is a lack of legislation and extremely limited juridical practice. The recognition 
is rather justified in implied intentions, individual agreements with the organization and the 
overall opinion of legal scholars throughout history. ICRC’s alleged international legal per-
sonality is to this day still not codified in the Geneva Conventions, its Additional Protocols, 
the organization’s Statues or the Movement’s Statutes. Despite this weakness, the ICRC does 
satisfy the criteria based on the traditional doctrine, implicating that it is in fact a subject of 
international law. 
   
A problematic impact of the recognition of ICRC as a subject of international law is whether 
the recognition entails that ICRC is a model for the international participation of other non-
State actors, such as Amnesty International or Save the Children. ICTY stated in the Simic 
case that the recognition of ICRC’s international legal status “does not ‘open the floodgates’ 
in respect of other organizations”.279 The statement was confirmed by ICTR in the case con-
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cerning Prosecutor v Tharcisse Muvunyi.
280
 Legal scholars are of the same opinion, when 
they argue that ICRC’s unique legal position “can hardly serve as a model for other Non-State 
Actors.”281 
 
The thesis thus concludes that the ICRC has a functional international legal personality and 
the consequences thereof largely correspond to the consequences of the legal status for IGOs 
in general. Furthermore, ICRC’s international legal personality has independent significance 
beyond what already results from international conventions and agreements. 
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